From a scientific materialist perspective, consciousness is an emergent property of complex neural networks in the brain. It is not something 'other' than the brain, but rather what the brain *does* at a certain level of organizational complexity. Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists largely operate under the assumption that a complete understanding of brain function will eventually lead to an understanding of consciousness, even if the 'hard problem' remains a significant hurdle. They focus on identifying the specific neural mechanisms (NCCs), cognitive architectures (GNWT), or informational properties (IIT) that give rise to conscious states. This viewpoint often emphasizes the incremental progress being made in mapping brain function, understanding neural plasticity, and decoding sensory perception. The belief is that continued empirical research, combined with refined theoretical models, will gradually close the explanatory gap. While acknowledging the difficulty, proponents of this view maintain an optimistic outlook that consciousness is a phenomenon ultimately explainable within the framework of physical science.